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Labor law reform is passionately debated among union activists 
and officials, labor economists, and industrial relations scholars. Some 
who are concerned that the decline in union membership in the United 
States threatens workers’ rights and working conditions believe labor 
law is an impediment to union success. Others believe that changes 
in employment structures and innovations in human relations methods 
mean unions and collective bargaining are no longer needed by today’s 
workers.
In addition, for decades most of the focus of labor law reform has 
been on organizing, with scant attention given to collective bargaining. 
Organizing new members is important, but organizing campaigns alone 
cannot succeed in increasing union membership. Workers join unions to 
improve their working conditions. Improved working conditions come 
from collective bargaining. The fact is that organizing does not matter 
if unions have no bargaining power. Furthermore, increased union bar-
gaining power should make unions more attractive to the unorganized. 
Union success at the bargaining table affects organizing success, and 
the degree of organization affects bargaining success.
These debates are passionate despite—or perhaps because of—the 
lack of empirical evidence as to how a law reform proposal would oper-
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ate. We believe that there is a great deal to be gained by using empiri-
cal methodology as one way to examine how a proposed labor law is 
likely to work, and that there should be more focus on the relationship 
between law and collective bargaining.
We have used an experiment here in order to explore one discrete 
aspect of collective bargaining to examine whether law affects percep-
tions of bargaining power. We first discuss how law can be used by 
unions and employers as a resource to bolster bargaining power. We 
then outline the methodology we used to test whether different legal 
regimes affected perceptions of the bargaining power of unions and em-
ployers. We end the chapter with a discussion of our results and conclu-
sions.
LAW AS A RESOURCE
Many laws—both statutory and judge-made—control or potentially 
affect collective bargaining. We hypothesize that the laws that deter-
mine how bargaining impasses are handled have a shadow effect on 
parties’ conduct preceding impasse. In other words, impasse laws are 
more than mere rules on how to handle deadlock. Each party will have 
taken a measurement of how and whether an impasse helps or hinders 
it and its bargaining partner. While that consideration will include eco-
nomics and the parties’ continued relationship, it will also depend on 
how the law treats an impasse. The parties will adjust their behavior 
based on their actual or perceived relative bargaining power based on 
the law. Furthermore, experienced bargainers will also shape their con-
duct based on their bargaining partner’s anticipated assessment and re-
sponse.
There are many different theories about the constituents and opera-
tion of bargaining power. Among the many factors that can collectively 
affect bargaining power are its economic context, state of the indus-
try, bargainers’ knowledge and abilities, degree of union organization, 
community sentiment and support, and law. Each can be seen as a re-
source, unevenly distributed between the bargainers in any one negotia-
tion. Although some resources, such as degree of union solidarity, that 
strengthen one side will weaken the other, not all factors will have that 
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effect. Unlike commercial bargaining, collective bargaining concerns 
parties whose fates are profoundly intertwined. Thus, a poor economy 
or a decline in an industry may weaken both parties. Strong leadership 
may lead to better outcomes for both sides. Engaging in a scorched 
earth policy may destroy both sides. Bargainers can potentially enlist 
these resources through strategies to make the best use of each in order 
to achieve their individual and mutual goals. Having more resources 
strategically employed should increase a party’s bargaining power. 
Having fewer resources or an inability to make use of one’s resources 
should decrease bargaining power. Certainly, the call for labor law re-
form manifests a belief that law plays an important role in bolstering or 
undermining union power. 
We have taken up that challenge by setting up a social science ex-
periment to explore some discrete aspects of the question whether law 
matters to collective bargaining, specifically, features of law that can 
affect bargaining power. The results reported here are only part of a 
larger experiment, and that experiment is the first part of a multiphase 
study. Results from that larger experiment are reported in Dannin and 
Singh (2004).
Three Impasse Regimes: Implementation on Impasse, Interest 
Arbitration, and Economic Power
We tested three regimes with different ways of resolving bargaining 
impasses based on the current private sector system (Regime A); inter-
est arbitration, commonly used in the public sector and advocated as 
a reform for the private sector (Regime B); and the bargaining system 
created under the National Labor Relations Act before judges created 
the doctrines of striker replacement and implementation upon impasse 
(Regime C).
We chose these three legal regimes for a number of reasons. First, 
we theorized that if law affects the process and substance of collective 
bargaining, these laws are sufficiently distinctive that we should see dif-
ferent responses, including different perceptions of bargaining power.
We also chose these legal regimes because each currently presents 
unique practical and theoretical issues connected with collective bar-
gaining. Therefore, an examination of these three methods for resolving 
impasses should be helpful as an initial step toward law reform. Briefly, 
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Regimes A and B currently are laws affecting actual bargaining. Re-
gime C provides an interesting alternative to Regime A, if the NLRA 
were stripped of judicial amendments and returned to the way Congress 
initially intended the NLRA operate.
Regime A (permanent striker replacement and employer implemen-
tation on impasse) is based on current private sector impasse law. The 
NLRA was enacted with no provisions concerning the specifics of how 
to conduct bargaining. It said nothing about the use of weapons or how 
to resolve impasses. The courts almost immediately began to create le-
gal doctrines that applied to bargaining and to the weapons employers, 
employees, and unions were allowed to use (Budd 1996; Dannin, Wagar, 
and Singh 2001; McClatchey Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026 
(D.C. Cir 1997; Sam M. Jackson, 34 NLRB 194 (1941); Westchester 
Newspapers, Inc. 26 NLRB 630 (1940)). Employees were forbidden 
from using partial strikes and sit-down strikes; and employers were per-
mitted to permanently replace strikers and to implement their final of-
fers upon reaching an impasse. Judges have added to and tinkered with 
the use of these weapons over the years (Dannin 1997, 2004).
Regime A focuses on the two key private sector impasse methods 
created by judicial decisions: the employer’s right to permanently re-
place strikers and the employer’s right to implement its final offer when 
the employer and union reach an impasse in bargaining. The latter doc-
trine is not as widely explored in industrial relations research but has 
been described in Dannin (1987, 1997). The doctrines of implementa-
tion upon impasse and striker replacement have been criticized as viola-
tions of human rights (Dannin 2004; Dannin, Wagar, and Singh 2001; 
Human Rights Watch 2000).
Under Regime A, at impasse, an employer may implement its final 
offer. No party is required to make concessions. If a union strikes, the 
employer may hire permanent replacements but may not fire strikers. 
When a strike ends, strikers may be recalled as positions become avail-
able. If an employer bargains in bad faith, the penalty is to be ordered 
to bargain in good faith (Dannin 1987, 1997; Dannin and Singh 2002; 
Dannin and Wagar 2000; Stolzenburg 2002).
We theorize that an employer in Regime A is likely to behave in a 
particular strategic way. When unemployment is high and/or if there 
is low employee solidarity, an employer is likely to assert an extreme 
position and not concede any demand. The employer has an incentive 
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to reach impasse, because then it can implement its final offer, perma-
nently replace strikers, and, perhaps, de-unionize. The union’s strategy 
is to make concessions to avoid impasse and thus implementation and a 
strike, and to accept poor offers because other alternatives are so unap-
pealing. Thus, a union is likely to move toward the employer’s position 
but not vice versa. As a result, the law moves the union’s bargaining 
power a notch lower than it would otherwise be in given economic or 
social circumstances (cf. Regime C). We propose, therefore, that under 
Regime A the employer’s bargaining power is strengthened and that of 
the union is weakened.
Regime B (interest arbitration) is based on public sector bargaining 
law. Strikes and lockouts are illegal. At impasse, the parties submit final 
offers to interest arbitration. The arbitrator chooses the best proposal 
based on the evidence offered. Interest arbitration is significant for law 
reform because it is being proposed to resolve first contract impasses in 
the private sector (U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-Manage-
ment Relations 1994).
We hypothesize that, with strike and lockout leverage removed, 
both parties must rely on persuading the other to accede to a proposal. 
Part of that persuasion is an awareness of how an arbitrator will react. 
Thus, both the employer and union are encouraged to make propos-
als that will be seen as reasonable and move toward the middle. We 
propose, therefore, that under Regime B, neither the employer nor the 
union is favored in terms of bargaining power.
Regime C (economic power) is Regime A without implementation 
or striker replacement. Strikes and lockouts are legal, but replacements 
may not be hired. At impasse no terms can be changed until agreement 
is reached. Regime C provides a method for resolving impasses that 
gives the employer and union the same or reciprocal rights when an 
impasse is reached. It also can be argued that this is the method closest 
to that originally enacted, without the judicial interpretations of striker 
replacement and implementation upon impasse that have transformed 
its operation. Regime C leaves it to each party to resolve impasses by 
deciding whether the proposals made are satisfactory to it.
We theorize that, under Regime C, the role law plays is to make 
negotiation more attractive than strategies such as trying to reach an 
impasse and avoid negotiation. Under Regime C the parties have un-
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fettered and equal use of strikes and lockouts as resources to create 
bargaining power. 
We predict that under Regime C employers and unions will frame 
their strategies based on their perceptions of their own and their bargain-
ing partner’s bargaining power. So if the employer sees union power as 
low because unemployment is high, its strike fund is depleted, and there 
is low union solidarity, the employer will be less likely to make con-
cessions. If, on the other hand, the employer sees the union as having 
high bargaining power because unemployment is low, the strike fund 
is adequate, and there is high solidarity, the employer is more likely to 
believe the union will stick to its demands, so the employer will make 
concessions to avoid a strike. The union should make similar calcula-
tions. The Regime C employer cannot count on reaching impasse to get 
its way, and the union would not have to make concessions solely to 
avoid an impasse, since only agreement would change the status quo. 
Thus, we propose that neither the employer nor the union would be 
favored in bargaining strength as a result of the law. 
One way of thinking about the degree to which each legal regime 
would affect bargaining power is to consider the following scenario. If a 
party was told to maximize its chances of attaining its bargaining goals 
and could choose to be either an employer or a union and also choose 
which regime to bargain under, we argue it would chose to be an em-
ployer under Regime A (EA). Put another way, if a party could choose 
the role it most wanted to avoid in order to minimize the chances of not 
being able to achieve its bargaining goals, it should choose to avoid be-
ing a union under Regime A (UA). Or if one rank ordered the six roles 
based on degree of bargaining power, the end points would be EA and 
UA. All other roles and regimes would be somewhere in the middle. 
METHODOLOGY
Subjects were 120 students who were attending a large public uni-
versity and a small private law school on the West Coast of the United 
States. Our sample consisted of 43 business and 77 law students. Forty 
males and 80 females participated in the study. The average age of the 
respondents was 27 years old (s.d. = 7.52). Twenty-eight percent of the 
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students who participated in the study had previous negotiation experi-
ence, although not collective bargaining or labor law experience.
The administration of the study followed the guidelines of the 
Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects (at both institutions), 
which mandated voluntary participation, informed consent, and subject 
anonymity. All subjects received remuneration of $30 each for the two 
hours they participated. The recruitment message invited students to 
participate in a two-hour research project on collective bargaining. It 
was e-mailed to the law students and read to a random selection of 
business classes (management, accounting and finance, and marketing). 
Nothing specific about the research project was mentioned in the adver-
tisements. The studies were administered in groups of approximately 
20–30 participants in each session.
When participants arrived at their scheduled session, they were ran-
domly assigned to a two-person group. In a few cases, when we had an 
odd number of participants, we had a three-person group. Each caucus 
was seated some distance from other caucuses, so they could not over-
hear other discussions. 
Each group was randomly assigned to one of six different caucuses: 
union caucuses UA, UB, or UC, or employer caucuses EA, EB, or EC. 
The participants were first told to read a one-page sheet. The sheet for 
all caucuses contained the following information:
Owen Corporation produces computer components. It is about 
to begin negotiating a collective bargaining agreement with the 
United Employees Association. The UEA represents hourly pro-
duction, plant clerical, quality control, shipping, warehouse, and 
clerical workers—approximately 256 employees. Employees are 
exposed to many chemicals used to produce the computer com-
ponents. The union is concerned that these may be hazardous and 
may cause health problems. Several workers compensation claims 
are now pending involving cases of pancreatic, throat, and lung 
cancer and various respiratory and skin aliments. In addition, this 
past year, several workers had babies with serious defects.
The union proposes 1) an across-the-board raise of 2 percent a year 
in each of the next three years, 2) installing a system to monitor levels 
of toxic substances in the workplace, 3) establishing a joint employer-
union health and safety committee, and 4) improved health insurance. 
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The employer takes the position that health problems are the result 
of improper use of safety devices and employee alcohol or drug abuse. 
The employer proposes 1) subcontracting the most hazardous work in 
the plant, 2) implementing random drug testing, and 3) making hazard-
ous work voluntary and paying a premium for it. 
All union caucus information sheets contained the following ad-
ditional information: 
You are meeting in a union caucus to discuss your strategies for 
bargaining. You are aware that you have the following individu-
als among your membership. Some employees may be HIV posi-
tive and would not want this known. Several are members of the 
Libertarian Party. Sixty percent of the workforce is female. Sev-
enty-three percent of the workforce is of child-bearing age. Your 
strategies must accommodate your constituents’ interests, your 
predictions as to your opponent’s strategies, and your plan to deal 
with those strategies. Keeping all this in mind, what strategy will 
put the union in the strongest position possible? Strongest means 
what will get the union the most possible. 
All employer caucus information sheets contained the following ad-
ditional information: 
You are meeting in an employer caucus to discuss your strategies 
for bargaining. You are aware that your managers, supervisors, and 
employees include individuals with diverse interests and views. 
The union has provided attorneys for all employees who have filed 
workers compensation claims and has informed you that it will be 
considering grievances and further legal action concerning work-
place health and safety.
You have been solicited by the president of a company which per-
forms both drug testing and assists in applicant screening and who 
hopes to gain your business. In fact, this is what first interested 
the company in testing. There has been news recently about other 
companies which ran into trouble because of drug use by employ-
ees.
Your strategies must accommodate your constituents’ interests, 
your predictions as to your opponent’s strategies, and your plan to 
deal with those strategies. Keeping all this in mind, what strategy 
will put the employer in the strongest position possible? Strongest 
means what will get the employer the most possible.
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Finally, each caucus had information about the way its legal regime 
resolved bargaining impasses. The information sheets for employer and 
union caucuses in Regime A (EA and UA) stated:
If a union and employer reach an impasse in bargaining, the em-
ployer may implement its final offer. There is no requirement to 
make concessions. If the union strikes, the employer may hire per-
manent replacements to take the jobs of the strikers but may not 
fire them. At the strike’s end the strikers are placed on a recall 
list and will be recalled if and as positions become available. If 
the employer bargains in bad faith, the only penalty is an order to 
bargain in good faith.
Regime A is based on the law that currently controls bargaining in 
the private sector in the United States as a consequence of various ju-
dicially developed doctrines permitting implementation upon impasse 
and striker replacement.
The information sheets for employer and union caucuses in Regime 
B (EB and UB) stated:
Strikes and lockouts are outlawed. When impasse is reached, the 
parties must submit their final offers to “final offer interest arbitra-
tion.” This means that each side will present evidence to support 
its proposals to an arbitrator at a hearing. The arbitrator will then 
choose the best proposal based on the evidence offered.
Regime B is based on interest arbitration, a method commonly used 
to resolve impasse in many public sector collective bargaining laws, 
and it is usually the case that strikes and lockouts are illegal in the pub-
lic sector.
The information sheets for employer and union caucuses in Regime 
C (EC and UC) stated:
Strikes and lockouts are legal. When impasse is reached, no re-
placement workers may be hired in either a strike or lockout 
situation. No terms may be changed until an agreement has been 
reached.
Regime C is a scenario that emphasizes the parties’ use of the equal 
economic weapons of strike and lockout and that appears to be congru-
ent with the law contemplated by the drafters of the NLRA.
After the participants had finished reading the information sheet for 
that caucus, they were told to develop a strategy for reaching the most 
favorable bargaining outcome for their side. After 15 minutes, the par-
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ticipants were told to switch positions—that if they were originally an 
employer, they should begin to develop a strategy from a union point of 
view, and if they were a union, they should begin to develop a strategy 
from an employer point of view. After another 15 minutes, they were 
told to return to their original identities and develop their final strate-
gies. Then after 10 minutes, they were told to begin writing down their 
strategies.
When all groups completed their strategies, we administered a sur-
vey that each participant was to fill out individually. When they were 
finished, we administered a survey that each caucus was to answer by 
group consensus. We then held a debriefing session during which we 
discussed the various caucuses’ laws and solicited participant reactions. 
The participants were not aware until the debriefing session that there 
were different legal regimes. Finally, we administered an individual 
questionnaire that permitted participants to add information or reac-
tions they wanted to report as a result of the debriefing.
No actual bargaining occurred, although the participants believed 
throughout the study that they would be bargaining. We did not define 
the term impasse but rather let the participants use their own sense of its 
meaning, one that is close to the various legal definitions without neces-
sitating an understanding of the legal complexities of the doctrine. The 
results discussed here rely on two of the three surveys—the individual 
level response and caucus level response.
In evaluating and drawing any implications from our results, we 
have borne in mind that there are important limitations in using this 
research methodology, although there are also advantages. The advan-
tages are those inherent in any modeling that first simplifies a complex 
system by limiting variables and then is used to examine and predict 
the workings of that more complex system (Roth 1995). Here, we have 
constructed a controlled environment in which to examine and contrast 
a limited number of features of the negotiation processes preceding im-
passe procedures. The subjects were given only a handful of issues to 
consider, although they were ones likely to be included in real negotia-
tion.
The primary disadvantage is that the exercise was not real. The sub-
jects had virtually no experience with collective bargaining law or with 
bargaining. They faced no losses and no real risks and thus were likely 
to have little invested in the process. The subjects had no opportunity to 
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learn from past negotiations and apply that experience nor to have been 
trained—things one would expect with real negotiators. Severe time 
limits meant emphasizing quick assessments and reactions. Finally, 
they never bargained but rather simply formulated strategies.
We were aware of all these problems and therefore tried to construct 
this social science experiment in a way that minimized as many of these 
problems as possible. In order to inject greater realism into the process, 
we chose bargaining issues that are commonly encountered in bargain-
ing and have ramifications the subjects could easily grasp. We provided 
the subjects with information about their respective constituents’ in-
terests in order to help them gauge how their proposals and strategies 
would likely be received. To help them behave more like an experi-
enced and sophisticated bargainer, we had subjects temporarily shift 
sides and act in the role of their bargaining partner. This was intended to 
help them appreciate potential strategies and the other side’s reactions 
and then reconsider their own strategies in light of that experience. In 
fact, during the sessions we heard them actually reacting in this way 
when they progressed through the session, as they realized what their 
bargaining partner’s limitations or strengths were. 
In addition, we recruited participants who lacked experience with 
collective bargaining and labor law so we would have reactions to the 
law that would be as untainted by bias and disinterested as is possible. 
We realize, of course, that law and business students do not come to 
a collective bargaining exercise with no opinions concerning unions, 
collective bargaining, or employers. Labor and collective bargaining 
are highly contested, and proposals for law reform are highly partisan. 
The participants in this exercise were therefore in the unique situation 
of having some practical experience with collective bargaining while 
being relatively nonpartisan in their responses and in having no real 
stake in the outcomes. 
Finally, we stopped short of collective bargaining because we want-
ed to retain a focus on the law and participants’ reactions to it. The 
give and take of real negotiating, especially with unsophisticated bar-
gainers, might have muddied their responses and made interpretation 
more difficult. In addition, we were concerned that we have sufficient 
participants to have statistically reliable results. Sessions of sufficient 
length to include bargaining would have drastically reduced our pool 
size. Time was limited to two hours total so we could include a larger 
number of subjects.
202   Singh and Dannin
This is the first part of a long-term, phased study to measure the op-
eration of discrete aspects of law with regard to bargaining. In this ini-
tial phase, we measured the impact of impasse law in a fairly unsubtle 
way. This makes it more likely to get a clear cut answer to the question 
whether law in general—and impasse law in particular—has an effect 
on bargaining. In this chapter we examine only the question of whether 
law has an impact on bargaining power. We use the participants’ percep-
tions of their power versus the power of their bargaining partner in their 
regime as a proxy for actual bargaining power. The ultimate measure 
of power would be a study of actual or simulated bargaining. How-
ever, perceptions of one’s own power relative to the party one bargains 
with can translate into real power. Therefore, measuring perceptions of 
power also measures a component of bargaining power.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Participant responses confirmed our overarching theory: different 
legal regimes resulted in different perceptions of bargaining power (Ta-
ble 8.1). First, using the individual level responses, in general we found 













AU 23 1 6 17
AE 17 3 4 16
BU 4 11 11 4
BE 8 4 7 6
CU 9 6 13 1
CE 2 10 15 0
AU+E 40 4 10 33 E: 36/U: (23)
BU+E 12 15 18 10 E: (3)/U: 8
CU+E 11 16 28 1 E: (5)/U: 27
Table 8.1  A Preliminary View of Bargaining Strength (Individual 
Response)
NOTE: The raw score does not add up to 120 since we did not include “no effect” and 
“did not answer” in this table. Parentheses indicate a negative value.
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power as net 59 points stronger than the union’s. Under Regime B, the 
participants rated the union’s bargaining power as net 5 points stronger 
than the employer’s, essentially a tie. Under Regime C, the participants 
rated the union as net 22 points stronger than the employer. Each re-
gime has a different pattern of perceptions of bargaining power. These 
differences are confirmed in other data from this study reported in Dan-
nin and Singh (2004).
While our general theory that law affects perceptions of bargaining 
power is supported by the data, our theories as to individual regimes 
were only partly supported. Thus, in two cases (Regimes A and B), our 
hypotheses were confirmed, and in one (Regime C) they were not. The 
detailed data on which those conclusions are based are included be-
low.
In Regime A individual responses, the union participants thought the 
law weakened the union (23 percent union stronger versus 65 percent 
union weaker), and saw the law as greatly strengthening the employer 
(89 percent employer stronger but 4 percent employer weaker). The 
employer respondents agreed that the law strengthened the employer 
(77 percent employer stronger versus 14 percent employer weaker) and 
weakened the union (18 percent union stronger but 73 percent union 
weaker) (Tables 8.2A and 8.2B).
The caucus level responses were in the same direction but more 
highly skewed. Union respondents saw Regime A as weakening the 
union (8 percent union stronger to 83 percent union weaker) and as 
strengthening the employer (92 percent employer stronger to 8 per-
cent employer weaker). Employer respondents also saw the regime as 
weakening the union (0 percent union stronger versus 82 percent union 
weaker) and strengthening the employer (82 percent employer stronger 
to 9 percent employer weaker) (Tables 8.3A and 8.3B).
In short, these results support the hypotheses as to Regime A with 
respect to bargaining strength. The participants saw the law as creat-
ing a highly unbalanced bargaining structure, with employer bargaining 
power from three to four times greater than the union’s. Such skewed 
bargaining power could destabilize or undermine collective bargaining 
to such a degree that it recreates the power relations the NLRA was 
enacted to rebalance (Dannin 2004). These results were in accord with 
other data from this study that found strong dislike for Regime A among 
the participants. They saw the law as highly unbalanced. Far more of 
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the participants wanted to alter the law of Regime A to make it more fair 
(Dannin and Singh 2005).
The results of Regime B show a very different pattern. The indi-
vidual responses from union respondents saw the law as tending to 
strengthen the union (52 percent union stronger and 19 percent union 
weaker, and 29 percent no answer or no effect) and weaken the em-
ployer (19 percent employer stronger, 52 percent employer weaker, and 
29 percent no answer or no effect). Employer respondents, however, 
tended to see the law as strengthening the employer (50 percent em-
ployer stronger, 25 percent employer weaker, and 25 percent no effect 
or no answer), while having a more neutral impact on the union (44 
percent union stronger versus 38 percent union weaker and 19 percent 
no answer) (Tables 8.2A and 8.2B).
The caucus level results were similar. Union caucuses saw the law 
as strengthening the union (67 percent stronger versus 11 percent union 
weaker and 22 percent no response or no effect) and weakening the em-
Table 8.2B  The Effect of Caucus on the Strength of Your Partner’s 
Bargaining Position (Individual Response, %)
UA UB UC EA EB EC Total
Strengthened 88.5 19.0 52.9 18.2 43.8 83.3 51.7
Weakened 3.8 52.4 35.3 72.7 37.5 33.3
Did not affect 5.6 0.8
No answer 7.7 28.6 11.8 9.1 18.8 11.1 14.2
N 26 21 17 22 16 18 120
NOTE: Chi-square = 55.36; d.f. = 15; and p < 0.01.
UA UB UC EA EB EC Total
Strengthened 23.1 52.4 76.5 77.3 50.0 11.1 47.5
Weakened 65.4 19.0 5.9 13.6 25.0 55.6 32.5
Did not affect 9.5 12.5 3.3
No answer 11.5 19.0 17.6 9.1 12.5 33.3 16.7
N 26 21 17 22 16 18 120
Table 8.2A  The Effect of Caucus on the Strength of Your Own 
Bargaining Position (Individual Response, %)
NOTE: Chi-square = 48.31; d.f. = 15; and p < 0.01.
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ployer (11 percent employer stronger versus 44 percent employer weak-
er and 44 percent no response). However, the employer caucuses saw the 
law as strengthening the employer (62 percent employer stronger versus 
38 percent weaker) and having no effect on the union’s bargaining power 
(50 percent union stronger and 50 percent union weaker). These results 
support our hypothesis that neither Regime B employer nor union is 
favored in terms of bargaining strength (Tables 8.3A and 8.3B).
Certainly, the perception of Regime B’s impact on bargaining 
strength differs markedly from that of Regime A. Both Regime B unions 
and employers saw the law as more likely to strengthen themselves and 
weaken their partner. Obviously this cannot reflect reality. What it may 
suggest is that each saw the law as treating them fairly and as providing 
ways to increase their bargaining power. This overall satisfaction with 
Regime B suggests resolving private sector impasses through interest 
arbitration could be more acceptable to both employers and unions than 
the current system (U.S. Commission on the Future of Worker-Manage-
ment Relations 1994). 
UA UB UC EA EB EC Total
Strengthened 91.7 11.1 33.3 50.0 100.0 47.4
Weakened 8.3 44.4 55.6 81.8 50.0 40.4
Did not affect 9.1 1.8
No answer 44.4 11.1 9.1 10.5
N 12 9 9 11 8 8 57
Table 8.3B  The Effect of Caucus on the Strength of Your Partner’s 
Bargaining Position (Caucus Response, %)
NOTE: Chi-square = 46.43; d.f. = 15; and p < 0.01. 
UA UB UC EA EB EC Total
Strengthened 8.3 66.7 88.9 81.8 62.5 11.1 51.7
Weakened 83.3 11.1 9.1 37.5 77.8 37.9
Did not affect 11.1 1.7
No answer 8.3 11.1 11.1 9.1 11.1 8.6
N 12 9 9 11 8 9 58
Table 8.3A  The Effect of Caucus on the Strength of Your Own 
Bargaining Position (Caucus Response, %)
NOTE: Chi-square = 36.29; d.f. = 15; and p < 0.01.
206   Singh and Dannin
Of course, experience with actual interest arbitration might alter this 
attitude. There is a well-known concern that interest arbitration creates 
dependency and weans employers and unions away from real collective 
bargaining (the “narcotic effect”) (Kochan and Katz 1992). Certainly, 
anyone who pays attention to public sector collective bargaining knows 
that the availability of interest arbitration has not brought about labor 
relations nirvana.
Nonetheless, given the study results, it seems worthwhile to rethink 
potential uses for interest arbitration in the context of private sector col-
lective bargaining. For example, it is widely believed that private sector 
bargaining is undermined by the weak remedy of a bargaining order 
when an employer has engaged in bad faith bargaining. This is seen as 
giving an employer who is determined to engage in bad faith bargaining 
a virtual license to continue this conduct. The NLRA says nothing about 
bargaining orders and certainly does not mandate them as a remedy for 
bad faith bargaining. What the NLRA does require under §10(c) is that 
remedies effectuate the policies of the NLRA. Section 1 states: “It is 
hereby declared to be the policy of the United States . . . [to encourage] 
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining . . . for the purpose 
of negotiating the terms and conditions of [workers’] employment . . .” 
If interest arbitration is more likely to promote the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining than an order to bargain in good faith, 
then it might make sense for the NLRB to order interest arbitration in 
appropriate cases (Dannin forthcoming).
The point is that an employer who faced an order to interest arbitra-
tion if it engages in bad faith bargaining might be more interested in 
reaching a negotiated agreement than in having an arbitrator impose 
terms. The results of this study and other survey answers by Regime B 
participants not discussed would support such a remedy (Dannin and 
Singh 2002, 2004, 2005). 
Regime C responses demonstrate yet a third pattern. Individual 
union negotiators saw the law as greatly strengthening union bargaining 
power (77 percent union stronger, 6 percent union weaker, and 20 per-
cent no answer or no effect), and also as generally enhancing employ-
er bargaining power (53 percent employer stronger versus 35 percent 
union weaker, and 12 percent no answer). Employers, however, saw 
the law as greatly strengthening union bargaining power (83 percent 
union stronger and 17 percent no effect or no answer) while weakening 
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employer bargaining power (11 percent employer stronger versus 56 
percent employer weaker, and 33 percent no answer) (Tables 8.2A and 
8.2B).
The caucus level response for Regime C shows a similar pattern. 
Union participants saw the law as greatly strengthening union bargain-
ing power (89 percent union stronger and 11 percent no answer) and 
tending to weaken employers (33 percent employer stronger and 56 
percent employer weaker, with 11 percent no answer). Employer partic-
ipants again saw the law as giving unions overwhelming strength (100 
percent union stronger) and greatly weakening employers (11 percent 
employer stronger versus 78 percent employer weaker, with 11 percent 
no answer) (Tables 8.3A and 8.3B).
We had theorized that Regime C would have a fairly neutral impact 
on bargaining strength since both employers and unions had the eco-
nomic weapons of lockout and strike but no others. Put in economic 
game theory terms, we saw it as akin to an ultimatum game with pun-
ishment. That is, if a party made an unacceptable offer, the offeree’s re-
fusal to accept would mean that neither received the benefits of change. 
Furthermore, the parties could use the strike and lockout weapons to 
punish the other for an unacceptable offer.
The results, however, did not support our predictions that the law 
in Regime C would have a neutral effect. Participants did not see the 
law as neutral. They perceived it as strongly increasing union bargain-
ing power. It is possible the participants, who had little experience with 
collective bargaining, felt the strike was a very strong weapon (Fossum 
2002). In addition, at the time the sessions were run, unemployment 
was low and the economy so strong that it was well known that employ-
ers were having trouble finding workers. As a result, the environment 
was one in which employers had relatively low leverage. It is also pos-
sible that the participants felt that employers should control workplace 
terms or that employees and unions were likely to behave irresponsibly. 
Yet another possibility is that the participants thought that Regime C 
would let even a weak union in poor economic conditions hold negotia-
tions hostage.
Again, turning to economic game theory, Regime C is an ultimatum 
game with punishment except that, in some cases, the punishment does 
not fall equally on both. A party can use punishment to give itself a 
reward. It gives a party who lacks the strength to use economic weap-
208   Singh and Dannin
ons the power to hold up changes the other party needs or desires by 
simply refusing to agree. It may also disproportionately reward a party 
who is happy with the status quo. Unlike Regime A, Regime C does 
not pick winners and losers. That is, it will not always be the union or 
the employer who wants to hold up change. For example, an employer 
who did not want to increase wages could simply refuse to agree, and 
a union that opposed subcontracting or other structural changes could 
easily retain the status quo.
Of course, over time, the parties would develop strategies to nego-
tiate their way out of impasses. A union might accede to changes that 
harmed employees if it believed this was preferable to harming the com-
pany and losing all jobs, and an employer might accept wage increases, 
because it would be better to give workers a bigger slice of the pie than 
have no pie at all. In other words, the “dog in the manger” phenomenon 
that lurks in this scenario might be overcome, because we can trust the 
parties to create a fair structure over time. If not, it may be useful to 
consider lessons from economic bargaining experiments and provide 
some sanction for a non-cooperator. Imposing interest arbitration as a 
remedy for overly long and destructive impasses could be a sanction 
that would resolve the impasse and push the parties to bargain.
On the other hand, if these results reveal how such a law would 
work in reality, it could lead to deep employer grievance, essentially 
the mirror image of what unions feel under private sector law now. The 
question this raises for law reform is whether it is possible to alleviate 
the employer sense of unfairness without making unions feel deeply 
aggrieved. These results are particularly interesting, given the advocacy 
for a system of collective bargaining based on economic weapons (Troy 
1999).
CONCLUSION
In this study, we found that each law had a different impact on par-
ticipants’ perceptions of bargaining strength. The scenarios were the 
same with the exception of the law that applied to impasse resolution. 
The results show that this fact alone had a powerful effect on the partici-
pants’ perceptions of bargaining power, and that these perceptions im-
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bued the entire process of bargaining and not only to the single event of 
reaching an impasse. The study therefore provides support for the basic 
theory that collective bargaining law should properly be seen as a re-
source that, along with other resources, can affect bargaining strength. 
Thus, the results suggest that theories about bargaining power that fail 
to include law will lack predictive power.
The results also confirm theoretical and anecdotal contentions that 
the judicially created doctrines of permanent striker replacement and 
implementation of the employer’s final offer upon impasse serious-
ly weaken union bargaining power relative to the employer (Dannin 
2005).
The study design provided a fertile way to test how specific laws 
operate. Given the nature of social science experiments in general and 
of these in particular, we interpret our results with caution. The way we 
use them is if our predictions were not confirmed or were found not to 
exist in the study context, then this would not prove that the effects did 
not exist in actual labor negotiations, but such a result would suggest 
caution in assuming they would. On the other hand, if predicted effects 
are found, this does not mean they will be found in actual labor negotia-
tions, but it makes the expectation more plausible and provides insights 
and a baseline for comparing what actually happens.
In addition, the results provide guidance as to how discrete aspects 
of the law affect bargaining power and the formulation of bargaining 
strategy. Ultimately these ought to affect collective bargaining out-
comes. The results also provide some evidence whether common sense 
instincts about a regime’s effects are reflected in human behavior. 
Finally, we think it is important to emphasize that we examined 
the reactions of nonpartisan, disinterested participants to different col-
lective bargaining regimes. For this reason, their responses provide a 
special window into the operation of the law. Most of those who com-
ment on labor law are highly partisan and self-interested. Therefore, the 
intensity and unanimity of the views of both those who took the roles 
of employer and union negotiators in their caucuses as to impasse reso-
lution in the private sector deserves special attention. The NLRA was 
enacted to promote equality of bargaining power between employers 
and employees. The study participants, however, perceived a law that is 
highly unbalanced. The participants saw the judicially created doctrines 
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of striker replacement and the employer’s right to implement its final 
offer upon impasse as heavily skewing power toward the employer. 
The NLRA was enacted because Congress concluded that law— 
corporate law at the time—so unbalanced bargaining power that work-
ers had lost the ability to bargain as equals with their employers. As a 
result, wage rates and the purchasing power of workers were depressed, 
leading to industrial strife and unrest. The results of this study sug-
gest that at least in the private sector, law—in this case, judge-made 
law—has so unbalanced bargaining power that private sector worker 
rights are again in danger.
Note
Funding for this study was provided by the California Western School of Law and the 
College of Business Administration, San Diego State University. However, the opinions 
presented are those of the authors and do not reflect those of the funding sources.
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